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Paris-Tel Aviv: Forgetting as Memory 
Ora Avni 
Yale University 
The definition of collective identity has been at the heart of our 
fin de siecle's preoccupations. Compounded by successive waves 
of human migration, the urgency of this concern has bestowed a 
new legitimacy upon a project of classification that the Enlighten- 
ment had all but disavowed (race, class, nation, political allegiance, 
and the all-pervasive but badly defined ethnicity-a list to which 
our generation has added gender and sexual orientation). Each of 
today's self-defined groups determines a political and epistemologi- 
cal agenda that spills over from the national or even international 
scenes to fuel our academic institutional quarrels. In France, as the 
Empire crumbled in the aftermath of World War II, decolonization 
exacerbated old conflicts over national identity and has since brought 
the very notion of nationhood under painful scrutiny. Today, the 
same conflicts have swollen the ranks of the extreme rightist, 
anti-immigration Front National lead by Jean-Marie Le Pen. The roots 
of the fundamental national discord that led to the success of the 
Front National are found in earlier times, however, in the crisis that 
did the most to elaborate the French notion of nationhood: the 
French Revolution, which redefined both the concept of Man and 
that of State. Predictably, the relationship between State and Man 
evolved over time (the process is still going on). In the nineteenth 
century, conflicts over the nature of France's national identity largely 
determined the political programs that pitted against each other three 
republics, two empires, one monarchy, and a Catholic Church eager 
to regain its control over the state (the Dreyfus affair constitutes 
one of the high points of this conflict). Any attempt to understand 
modern France's political and national imaginaire outside the frame- 
work of these conflicts runs the risk of imposing foreign concepts 1
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on a specifically French context. This holds especially true for the 
much debated set of questions that have come to be labeled "iden- 
tity politics," and that constitute today some of the major misunder- 
standings between Frenchmen and Americans, even as they share 
progressive and "liberal" views. 
The first modern document that defines the rights and obliga- 
tion of a minority in France was the Decret d'emancipation des 
Juifs (The Decree Emancipating Jews)-and it did so by pointedly 
denying them the status of "minority." At the same time, since Jews 
are the only minority whose presence is recorded in France since 
the Gaul lic era and whose history, qua minority, is inextricably en- 
twined with French history, the status of French Jews has been both 
the model and the touchstone for the relationship between other 
minorities and the Nation.' Not only does the 1791 Decret 
d'imancipation des Juifs therefore mark a major turning point in the 
history of the Jews of France, but it is also the document that does 
the most to reveal the Jacobin stance on nationhood and citizenship 
that, although hotly debated, continues to prevail today in France. 
In the last two or three decades, France has seen an intense 
renewal of self-questioning by its Jews. Although most of it has 
been associated with the memory and commemoration of the depor- 
tation of Jews to Nazi death camps under the German Occupation 
and the Vichy regime, I think that it would be a mistake to limit our 
analysis of this crisis to the aftermath of the Occupation, however 
tempting this simplification may prove. In this essay, I shall sketch 
an alternative understanding of French Jewry's current identity cri- 
sis. Or rather, since I am neither a historian nor a sociologist, I shall 
defer instead to La Place de l'etoile by Patrick Modiano, one of the 
best recent French novels, which, as its author emphatically claims, 
treats "the Jewish problem and nothing else" ("Entretien" 42). With 
the economy afforded to it by poetic license, La Place de l'etoile 
offers one of the most pointed and probing examinations of the 
problems facing French Jews today.' 
La Place de l'etoile as Site of Memory 
By all accounts, Patrick Modiano's La Place de l'etoile, pub- 
lished in 1968, is a strange book. Although it is a first-person narra- 
tive, there is hardly a "narrative" to speak of; the plot is inconsis- 
tent and truncated; the action tosses the protagonist rather ran- 
domly all over Europe and Israel; and the narrator himself is too 2




mercurial to characterize. Similar liberties are taken with the novel's 
time-frame: the narrator is, oddly, always in his twenties, appearing 
alternately as a contributor to Je suis partout, a patient of Freud 
well after World War II, Eva Braun's lover, and a French Jew in search 
of his roots in Israel.' To further confound the reader, he is some- 
times athletic, tall, dark, and handsome, sometimes dying of tuber- 
culosis, and sometimes (six times, to be precise) actually killed- 
which is odd for anyone, but even more so for a narrator who, by 
definition, must be alive to tell his story. 
And yet, paradoxically, despite La Place de l'itoile's disregard 
for any semblance of verisimilitude (historical, psychological, or 
other), history-or more precisely French Jewish history-is the 
novel's major concern. Take the title of the novel, for example. It 
refers to a site in Paris, in the center of which stands l'Arc de 
Triomphe, which commemorates Napoleon's victory at Austerlitz. It 
is also known as a marvel of urban planning that owes its name to 
the circular confluence of large avenues that form a star, the center 
of which affords a privileged vantage point over the city-just as 
Modiano's novel affords us a privileged vantage point over the city 
and, by extension, over France. But the phrase la place de l'itoile 
also means, literally, the place of the star, and in the Jewish context 
of the novel, of the yellow star Jews were obliged to wear under the 
German occupation. This linguistic conflation of the French and 
Jewish histories is further illustrated even before we actually open 
the book by an anecdote strategically placed, first, on the jacket of 
the novel, and then again, as an epigraph: 
In June of 1942, a German officer approaches a young man and 
says: "Excuse me sir, where is the Place de l'Etoile?" 
The young man points to the left side of his chest. 
La Place de l'itoile deals then with French-Jewish identity in 
the wake of World War II. Yet, as the above anecdote points out, 
that Jewish identity is intricately bound up with France's own sense 
of identity -l'Arc de Triomphe is, after all, the French commemora- 
tive monument that does the most to evoke images of France's his- 
torical grandeur. In modern France, national identity is firmly 
grounded in history and its commemoration-mostly as a result of 
the Third Republic's deliberate effort to "republicanize" the masses 
through an elaborate system of public education in which the teach- 
ing of history (both political and cultural) figured pre-eminently. 3
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Hence, for the last century, French patriotism and identity have been 
inseparable from identification with history. The historian Charles 
Lang lois notes with amusement that in response to the 1897 bacca- 
laureate question "What is the use of the teaching of history?", 
eighty percent of the students stated "to exalt patriotism" (Lang lois 
288-89). Around the same time, Ernest Lavisse, the official historian 
of the Third Republic, whose books were used in the French school 
system for half a century, staunchly declared: 
I know that if I denied myself certain feelings and certain ideas, 
my love for my birthplace, a long memory of my ancestors, the 
joy of discovering my own soul in their thoughts and actions, in 
their history and in their legends; if I did not feel that I am part 
of a whole whose origin is lost in a distant fog and whose future 
is unknown; if I did not quiver at the sound of a national an- 
them; if I did not adore the flag the way a pagan adores an idol 
who demands incense and on certain days, hecatombs; if I for- 
got our national suffering, truly, I would no longer know who I 
am or what I am doing in this world. My life would not be worth 
living. (Lavisse 322)4 
This confession is revealing in that not only does it ground 
nationalism in a veneration of the collective past, but it also does 
the same with respect to personal identity. In so doing, it collapses 
the difference between national and personal identity. La Place de 
l'etoile dutifully follows Lavisse's prescription. Schlemilovitch's 
quest for identity takes the form of a search for a national past 
which, in Lavisse's words, he could adore as one does in a religious 
cult and in which he would discover his own soul. This past would 
therefore be at once personal and national. Significantly, exemplary 
historical characters abound in La Place de l'itoile, especially those 
most often depicted in school readers and history textbooks, such 
as Le Petit Lavisse and Le Tour de France par deux enfants, or in 
well-known patriotic paintings such as those of Gros and Delacroix. 
The novel is brimming with those exemplary heroes who, known to 
all, have come to constitute a shared heritage vital to French na- 
tional identity: Clovis, Saint Louis, Jeanne d'Arc, Philippe Auguste, 
Conde, Napoleon. . . . 
And yet, there is a twist to this history, since, while he is a 
run-of-the-mill Frenchman, Schlemilovitch is also of Jewish ances- 
try. Abiding by Lavisse's teaching, he wishes to hold on to the 
memory of his ancestors, to the joy of discovering his own soul in 4




their thoughts, actions, history, and legends. What ancestors, how- 
ever? Where will he find those memories if French history makes no 
mention of Jews? Should he cross out of his memory some, but not 
all, of his ancestors (and their histories)? But then, did he not learn 
from the French tradition that his "ancestors" provide the ground- 
ing for his national allegiance? Only a revision of the exemplary 
narrative can resolve this quandary; a good logician, Schlemilovitch 
adds his Jewish view point to the depiction of events normally found 
in French history books. 
A brief example will clarify this last remark. In one of his experi- 
mentations with various models of national allegiance, Schlemilovitch 
tries to be a "true" Frenchman by conforming to the regionalist ideal 
of living a rustic life in the country.' In a remote village he becomes 
a school teacher and fervently teaches none other than the most 
glorious military chapters of French history: Jeanne d' Arc's tri- 
umphs, Philip II's victory over King John of England (Jean sans 
terre, John Lackland, whose nickname is an ironic nod to the tradi- 
tional Jewish predicament), Conde's victory at Rocroi, Napoleon's 
at Arcole. . . . His enthusiasm is, however, short lived: 
I soon realized that I lacked the furia francese. The blond knights 
left me behind and the banners bearing the fleur-de-lis fell out 
of my hands. The lament of a Yiddish singer spoke to me of a 
death that did not wear spurs, casoars, or white gloves. 
Finally, at my wits end, I pointed at Gran-Gevrier, my best 
student: "It was a Jew that broke the Soissons vase! A Jew, do 
you hear me? Copy the following a hundred times: 'The Soissons 
vase was broken by a Jew.' Do your homework, Gran-Gevrier! 
You have an F, Gran-Gevrier. I am putting you on detention.' " 
(118) 
What is the Soissons vase? No less than one of the founding 
moments of French nationalism, as Clovis, the fifth-century chief of 
a Frankish tribe who converted to Catholicism-and is therefore 
believed by some to be the founder of France-insisted on return- 
ing to the Archbishop Remi (who was later canonized) a vase that 
was part of the loot taken during the decisive battle of Soissons.6 In 
contradiction with the time-honored tribal tradition of equality among 
warriors, however, he did so even before the victors had had a chance 
to divide the spoils ("hors part"). One of Clovis's soldiers, keen on 
defending his ancestral privileges, objected to the arbitrariness of 
the "hors part" and, out of pique, hit and broke the vase. A year 5
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later, Clovis found an opportunity to lower his axe on that very 
soldier's head, a scene during which he uttered one of those phrases 
known to every French school boy and girl: "Just as you did to the 
vase in Soissons. "' A laudable Christian deed indeed. 
And yet, notwithstanding Schlemilovitch's ire, nothing in the 
only account we have of the Soissons vase episode allows us to 
surmise that the soldier might have been Jewish. Quite the contrary, 
he was most likely a true Frank and a champion of tribal traditions. 
Why then would Modiano/Schlemilovitch tamper with such a well- 
known historical narrative? Precisely because it testifies to the very 
nature of the construction of identity in France. In inscribing a Jew- 
ish presence in the history of that crucial founding moment, 
Schlemilovitch simply follows Lavisse's blueprint: the path to iden- 
tity must take him through the discovery of his own soul in his 
ancestors' legends. With a minor "correction," he can now partake 
in the narrative shared by all French men and women without having 
to elide the Jewish part of his identity (furthermore, inserting a Jew- 
ish presence at the birth of the Nation may even counter the Right's 
repeated claim that Jews are latecomers, and therefore not part of 
the "true France"). 
Any revision of collective memory must, however, comply with 
the patterns that shaped that memory in the first place. Given 
France's past persecution of Jews, the repeated charges of disloy- 
alty to which they were subjected, given France's promulgation of 
its own harsh "Jewish Laws" in 1940 and its willing collaboration 
with the Nazis in the deportation of Jews-given all these constraints, 
one cannot construct just any memory. Narrative consistency and 
continuity, logical identity, and psychological coherence impose 
formidable limitations on a Jew's ability to formulate historical nar- 
ratives in which he will play a credible part. Even as he tries to find 
"antecedents in French history," what role, except that of the "out- 
sider" or the "villain," can a Jew play in a founding scenario in 
which State and Church (that is, the Catholic Church) are fused? 
Schlemilovitch's three-step reasoning is therefore impeccable. First, 
if national identity draws on a shared past, then Jewish French na- 
tionals should share this past. Second, if this past makes no men- 
tion of the part Jews may have played in it, such an omission needs 
to be addressed and corrected. Last, to be credible, a "corrected" 
past has to comply with verisimilitude (for lack of a verifiable truth), 
must conform to established and recognizable historical patterns, of 6




which the most prevailing for a Jew is the tradition of alienation, 
marginalization, demonization, and persecution. Hence, if 
Schlemilovitch must identify a Jew in this founding episode, the 
only candidate for the part is the greedy soldier who opposed the 
magnanimous gesture of the noble king, and the righteous union of 
Church and State. The narrative that passes as true is not the one 
that tells what "really happened" but, as Aristotle emphasized, the 
one that enacts general principles and follows conventions that 
conform to what is known to be possible. 
What then is the difference between a Jew like Schlemilovitch 
and, for the sake of the argument, another like Marc Bloch, co-founder 
of the illustrious Anna les school of historiography, who was ex- 
ecuted as a member of the French Resistance in 1944 by the German 
occupiers? In 1940, Bloch wrote: 
I am Jewish, not by religion since I practice neither the Jewish 
religion nor any other, but by birth. . .. The only time I claim my 
origins is when I face an anti-Semite. Those who will oppose my 
testimony may try to ruin it by declaring me a miteque . . . . I 
shall answer them that my great-grandfather was a soldier in 
1793; that my father served in Strasbourg during the 1870 siege 
and that he and my two uncles left their native Alsace after its 
annexation to the Second Reich; that I was taught to worship 
those patriotic traditions which Alsatian Jews have always fer- 
vently upheld; and, finally, that France, from which some would 
like to expel me today-perhaps (who knows?) will even suc- 
ceed-will remain, whatever happens, the fatherland I cannot 
uproot from my heart. I was born in France, I drank from the 
wells of her culture, I made her past my own, I breath freely only 
under her skies, and, in turn, I have done my best to defend her.' 
(L'etrange defaite 31-33) 
Bloch was an accomplished product of the republican tradition: secu- 
lar and fervently patriotic. His only religion was republicanism, its 
Jacobin values and traditions: first, he invoked his right of birth ("I 
was born in France"), second, he derived his personal identity from 
his relationship to France's past ("I drank from the wells of her cul- 
ture, I made her past my own"), and finally, he proclaimed his uncon- 
ditional loyalty to the Nation ("I breathe freely only under her skies"). 
In other words, he came as close to Lavisse's ideal as one can come 
without sheepishly denying his Jewish origins-but then, did all he 
could to minimize their political or civic importance. This discursive 
strategy illustrates to the letter the Jacobin ideal. He is indeed of 7
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Jewish origin, implies Bloch, but this fact is irrelevant both to his 
civic status (French citizen), and to his love for and loyalty to France. 
What then is the difference between pre- and post-Occupation 
Jews, between Bloch and Schlemilovitch? A shattered dream. Bloch 
died as a Frenchman. His execution as a French patriot at the hands 
of German soldiers validated his beliefs. Unlike so many other French 
Jews, he was neither deported by the French police nor killed by 
Vichy militia. In other words, he died before realizing the extent to 
which France had betrayed the Jacobin ideal with which he so to- 
tally identified. After the war, however, as France loudly reaffirmed 
its universalist tradition, the surviving French Jews were called upon 
to return to the same ideals that had failed them, to reintegrate into 
the very same society that had just betrayed them, to trust the very 
hand that had just stripped them of their civil rights or sent them to 
the "East." The battered memory of a whole generation of Jews 
stood, then, in sharp contradiction to the beliefs around which the 
healing nation was rallying. Not to be excluded a second time from 
the project of national unification, they opted for silence-a silence, 
however, laden with untold memories.1° 
French Historiography and Jewish Identity 
Marc Bloch wrote that "failure to understand the present is 
inevitably due to ignorance of the past" (L'etrange defaite 12). Per- 
haps not just any past. If it is to account simultaneously for one's 
personal and one's collective identity, history must be monological. 
In other words, if adherence to the past is to cement the nation, this 
past must be the same for all. When this historical master narrative 
conflicts with the memory of any group within the nation, however, 
both the historical narrative and the constitution of the individual 
suffer. French-Jewish history, for example, includes a few chapters 
that necessarily "escaped" Lavisse's attention-the very same chap- 
ters whose logic imposed on Schlemilovitch his curious identifica- 
tion with Clovis's rebellious warrior. Those chapters would have 
taught that until the French Revolution, Jews were not equal before 
the law: their safety and well-being depended directly on the deals 
they managed to cut with the authorities-either with local noble- 
men or with the crown itself. Some Jewish communities then lived 
relatively well (in Bordeaux, notably), others did not (in Alsace) - 
but even that distinction was very unstable. For the sake of simpli- 
fication, we may generalize and say that, until the Revolution, the 8




Jews of France (note that they were not "French") suffered repeated 
massacres, forced conversions, confiscations of wealth, and fre- 
quent exiles that culminated in their final expulsion in 1394 by royal 
decree (a decree that, incidentally, has never officially been revoked). 
They were subjected to especially heavy taxation, to laws that for- 
bade them to own land and, often, even to reside within the town 
limits; they were also excluded from the guilds on which the power 
of the rising bourgeoisie and the early industrialization of France 
rested. 
Many centuries of misery, then, ended in 1791 when it was de- 
creed that French Jews fell under the new Constitution, just like 
other Frenchmen. This was a first in the history of European Jewry. 
French Jews were euphoric: 
Behold, this people that used to be persecuted and rejected, 
and that now proudly raises its head; . . . behold as astonished 
fathers tell their children of a world order that is new and never- 
theless so natural. Behold as they tell their children how these 
generous Frenchmen have given us the first example of justice 
the world has ever rendered to our unfortunate nation. Yes, 
children, this is your fatherland, your Jerusalem, this is the land 
God promised your ancestors. Hail, oh welcoming land, thou 
who hast adopted us. Let us raise our hands to the heavens- 
join us in prayer, dear children. The Father of all men welcomes 
your prayers. Bring the blessing of our heavenly Father on this 
country, which is in its essence good, generous, open, and noble. 
May Jews and Frenchmen be one brotherly nation forever. 
Le commissaire du comite Saint-Roch, 
citoyen francais de confession juive 
(qtd. in Philippe 117) 
We should understand, however, the nature of the French eman- 
cipation of Jews. The Decree freed Jews to be French, not to be 
"Jewish." Even as we note that the Constitution and the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man can be seen as the culmination of the French 
Enlightenment, we should remember that the very same Enlighten- 
ment was not all that favorable to Jews as such. Its ideals were 
deeply secular. The philosophes denounced religion as supersti- 
tion and saw it as a tool in the hands of the monarchy. Religion was 
the main obstacle on the road to the republican and humanist edu- 
cation envisioned by the reformers. The target of the philosophes' 
criticism was, of course, Catholicism, the ruling religion. But they 9
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also denounced Judaism in which they located, first, the roots and 
inspiration of Catholicism, and second, a collection of outdated and 
nefarious segregative practices. The Jewish religion was therefore 
generally reviled by the philosophes (with the notable exception of 
Diderot)-a political stand that should not be confused either with 
old-fashioned Church-inspired anti-Judaism or with later forms of 
racial anti-Semitism. 
The Emancipation Decree did not clear the Jews of the 
philosophes' charges. In the end, Judaism retained its negative value. 
The Revolution only introduced a new distinction between "Juda- 
ism" and "Jews": while Judaism remained a disparaged religion, Jews 
themselves, as individuals, became citoyens-provided, of course, 
they abandoned their segregative practices (hence the substitution 
of the term"israilites" for "juifs," which had come to denote those 
practices). With the Emancipation Decree, it was understood that 
Jews would become "normal," that is, that they would strip away 
their differences and be like any other Frenchman-in short, that 
they would assimilate." In this respect, Clermont-Tonnerre's much 
quoted declaration at the General Assembly in 1789 set the tone: 
Inasmuch as they are individuals, we must grant everything to 
Jews, but inasmuch as they are a nation, nothing. They can be 
neither a political body nor a special order. Individually, they 
must be citizens. (qtd. in Philippe 112) 
Take another example. In 1786, the Royal Academy of Metz an- 
nounced a writing competition on the subject, "Is it possible to 
make Jews happier and more useful in France?" L'Abbe Gregoire 
won the competition in 1788 with an essay entitled "Essay on the 
Jews' Physical, Moral, and Political Regeneration." "Regeneration?" 
The contest only asked for "happier and more useful." Regenera- 
tion, on the other hand, implies that Jews suffer from a fatal flaw, 
from a physical, moral, or political disease. This word does little to 
exonerate them from the charges leveled against them (especially in 
Metz, which was more anti-Jewish than, say, Paris). And yet the 
winning essay was a landmark step toward the 1791 Emancipation 
Decree and Gregoire himself was a staunch defender of the civil 
rights of French Jews. A lesser known fact is that in 1786, the same 
Gregoire had written another report to the General Assembly recom- 
mending the ban of dialects and patois, which consequently led the 10




Assembly to decree in 1794 that French would be the only official 
language of the nation (note that Gregoire was also a strong advo- 
cate of the abolition of slavery)." The pattern that emerges is that in 
its most progressive and humanitarian form, the Republic's elabora- 
tion of nationalism (or even the principles of "liberte, egalite, 
fraternite") relied on the notion of civil conformity. While we in the 
United States, see multiculturalism as a progressive expression of 
political and cultural tolerance, the winning Jacobin ideology of the 
French Revolution and, more precisely, the decree emancipating the 
Jews, expressed the very same progressive political and cultural 
tolerance by effacing differences, by ensuring conformity-a con- 
cept that the Third Republic zealously promoted and eventually im- 
posed. In short, diversity was definitely out, reactionary, un-French. 
And yet, to be Jewish was to be different. In the eighteenth 
century, Jews defined themselves primarily by their religion, that is, 
precisely by the very same religious practices that were so deni- 
grated by the Enlightenment. To compound this difficulty, Jewish 
religion and identity had always rested on a strong sense of Jewish 
history and memory." To abandon religious practices or Jewish 
memory was tantamount to giving up Judaism altogether (only about 
a century later would a new form of Judaism emerge in Germany, with 
the Reform movement led by Moses Mendelssohn). While granting 
Jews civil rights, the Decree thus voided the mainstay of Jewish life: 
a strong sense of community based on a shared memory. As such, 
not only did the Decree impose conflicts of memories and histories 
on French Jews, but at the same time, it inaugurated a national ethos 
by which these same conflicts were deemed unpatriotic. 
And yet, for the most part, French Jews welcomed the Decree. 
They set out to "earn" their new equality by becoming truly French 
and gradually abandoned most of the religious practices that set 
them apart. In short, they "assimilated." France, not Canaan, be- 
came the Promised Land. Whereas the Jewish tradition requires that 
each Jew thinks of himself as having been personally freed from 
ancient Egyptian bondage, French Jews remembered and commemo- 
rated another freedom: the one they received from the Republic to 
which they had become fiercely loyal. In other words, they inscribed 
French history over Jewish history, as if on a palimpsest, and all but 
"forgot" the original text. At the time, it seemed a fair price to pay for 
the privilege of "belonging. ,,I4 
11
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The Virtue of Forgetting 
In forgetting their alienating past so as to secure the unified, 
noncontroversial historical narrative needed to cement national unity, 
French Jews were undoubtedly espousing the political thought of 
the times. In his Qu'est-ce qu'une nation? (1882), still the major 
reference for France's modern reflection on nationalism, Ernest 
Renan had indeed proclaimed that to be a nation, France must for- 
get, for example, the Saint Barthelemy massacre, and the massacres 
of the thirteenth century." Furthermore, not only were Jews abiding 
by the universalist ideals espoused by the Jacobins but, more gen- 
erally, they were in line with more than a century of European intel- 
lectual history. Whether we read Darwin (On the Origin of Species 
by Means of Natural Selection or the Preservation of Favoured 
Races in the Struggle for Life [1859]), Nietzsche (On the Uses and 
Disadvantages of History for Life [1874]), Bergson (Matter and 
Memory [1906]), Freud (his whole oeuvre), or Halbwachs (Collec- 
tive Memory [1925]) -to mention the most influential-the most 
progressive figures of the times offer the same "solution" to the 
conflict of differences: whatever might pose a threat for the present 
or future well-being of either the individual, the community, the Na- 
tion, or the species must be dismissed, destroyed, repressed, sup- 
pressed, annulled, forgotten." 
After the civil wars of the thirteenth and the sixteenth centuries 
came the civil war of 1940-44. France set out to forget one more 
chapter of its history for the sake of national unity. French Jews 
went along and, in their eagerness to reintegrate into the nation, 
played down the ease with which Vichy had annulled the law that 
guaranteed their right to integration (thus playing down the fragility 
of that law) and reclaimed their Jacobin heritage (at least until the 
seventies)." Indeed, the glorious standing de Gaulle claimed for 
France among the Allies stood in stark contrast to her spectacular 
military defeat, to the armistice she hastily signed with the victor, 
and especially, to her willing and often eager collaboration with Ger- 
many-including, of course, the promulgation of Jewish laws, the 
internment of Jews (mostly foreigners, but recently naturalized French 
Jews were stripped of their citizenship to facilitate internment and 
expulsion, while longtime French Jews were often called upon to fill 
German quotas of convoys to the "East"), and finally, their deporta- 
tion. De Gaulle then saved France a second time: without as much as 
batting an eyelash, he rewrote history. He "forgot" that the General 12




Assembly had legally voted to give full power [pleins pouvoirs] to 
Petain and that the hero of Verdun had been enthusiastically em- 
braced by an overwhelming majority of Frenchmen in 1940, despite 
his defeatism and his decidedly pro-Nazi politics. He "forgot" that 
although some Frenchmen fought with the Allies, others enrolled in 
the S.S. and fought with the Nazis on the eastern front, and that the 
Vichy government lead by Petain had indeed hoped and actively 
negotiated for a more extensive military collaboration with Nazi Ger- 
many. He "forgot" that a civil war was still raging in France. In his 
best prophetic oratory style, he rewrote history as soon as he en- 
tered Paris proclaiming, much to the delight of the largely collabora- 
tionist capital that had turned patriotic at the eleventh hour: 
Paris outrage! Paris brise! Paris martyrise! mais Paris libere! libere 
par lui-meme, libere par son peuple avec le concours des armies 
de la France, avec le concours de la France entiere, de la France 
qui se bat, de la seule France, de la vraie France, de la France 
eternelle. 
Paris, which has been violated! Paris, which has been shattered! 
but Paris which has been liberated! Liberated by itself, by its 
people, with the help of the armies of France, with the help of 
the whole of France, of a France which fights, of the only France, 
of true France, of eternal France. (qtd. in Rousso, Le Syndrome 
30) 
Gaullism propagated a myth according to which true patriotism 
had never given in to the pressures of a handful of collaborators. On 
the international scene, this myth earned France its "rightful" place 
among the victorious allies. On the national scene it paved the way 
for national reconciliation and consolidation and let a few convicted 
collaborators bear the brunt for treason-to the relief of the majority 
of Frenchmen whose past was, to say the least, tainted." And lo and 
behold, history went obligingly along, Frenchmen went along, and 
Paris "forgot" its collaboration with the victorious enemy, forgot 
the morning papers of the last four years and the partying with the 
Germans; forgot its pro-Nazi movies, theaters, books, radio, 
chansoniers, exhibits, and cabarets, and forgot its anti-Semitism (and 
this time, I am hardly simplifying). With the onset of the Cold War, 
France also forgot the crucial role the communists had played in the 
much-touted Resistance and expelled them from the government. 
Anything that might have harmed the glorious future of France in 13
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the new world order was dismissed, repressed, annulled, suppressed, 
forgotten. As de Gaulle exuberantly proclaimed "Les jours des pleurs 
sont passes. Les jours de gloire sont revenus" 'the days of mourn- 
ing are over, the days of glory have returned,' echoing the lyrics of 
"La Marseillaise," "les jours de gloire sont arrives" 'the days of 
glory have arrived' (qtd. in Duras 44). The timing of this proclama- 
tion was particularly ironic since it was pronounced on April 3,1945, 
that is, just as the first concentration and death camp survivors 
were returning to Paris with their horror stories. All de Gaulle had to 
offer them was, in so many words, "it's over, let's forget the past and 
go back to business as usual"-"les jours de gloire sont revenus." 
Only a generation later, in the seventies, would France begin to face 
its suppressed past-awakened from its slumber by American Rob- 
ert Paxton's Vichy France: Old Guard, New Order (1972, translated 
into French in 1973) and Marcel Ophuls' documentary Le Chagrin 
et la pitie (The Sorrow and the Pity [1971]). Modiano's early books, 
published at the same time, were yet another reminder that de Gaulle's 
days of glory were but a delusion. The party was over. 
Tel Aviv-Paris 
And what of Tel Aviv, announced by my title? In one of his last 
journeys, Schlemilovitch goes to Israel. Now, in 1967, the world still 
saw in Israel more a redeeming myth than a reality. It was a construc- 
tion meant to counter the negative stereotypes propagated by pre- 
war anti-Semitism. To the charges of cosmopolitanism and lack of 
national loyalty, "Israel" (I use the quotation marks to refer to the 
country qua construction until the seventies) opposed a pioneer- 
ing spirit, brave men and women selflessly committing themselves 
to a national project and enthusiastically rebuilding their newly re- 
claimed fatherland-one hand on the steering wheel of a tractor and 
the other on an Uzi. Whereas in the past, Jews had been accused of 
being parasites whose shady financial practices exploited the coun- 
try without contributing to the national economy, "they" now farmed 
the land and strove for economic self-sufficiency. Whereas the same 
Jews had been accused of cowardliness, or, worse, of going like 
cattle to slaughter, "they" now fought proudly and heroically to 
survive against all odds. Whereas Jews were accused of being 
sneaky, evasive, and skulking, "they" are now seen as loud, obtru- 
sive, and blunt. In short, "Israel" remained defined by the very same 
anti-Semitic stereotypes it was said to have dispelled-only a 14




contrario, negatively (even the much praised slogan "Never Again" 
testifies to this difficult relationship to the past). For the sake of life 
(Nietzsche), survival (Darwin), action (Bergson), psychological 
well-being (Freud), "Israel" had turned the page on the Jewish 
Diaspora and broken its ties with its recent past. In short, "it" had 
opted for forgetting, not the Saint Barthelemy massacre, not the 
Collaboration, but the embarrassing death camps. (Let's be clear, 
however: I am not describing the young state of Israel whose atti- 
tude toward the Jewish past was far more complex than its public 
image conveyed; I am describing how it was perceived.). 
If this "Israel" found such strong popular support in France 
until the late sixties, it was in very large part because "it" corre- 
sponded to France's need to consolidate its own future-at the 
price of forgetting its past (all the more so, since in erasing these 
years, "Israel" whited out the Genocide and, consequently, the part 
played by France in its implementation). "Israel" was the mirror im- 
age of France's Gaullist national project and, ironically, of the 
assimilationist tendencies of the majority of its Jews. 
All this does not sit too well with Schlemilovitch, who, after the 
Collaboration, lost faith in the Jacobin myth. "Forgetting" had done 
little for those Jews who, lured by the Jacobin ideals, had elected 
France as their country of adoption. Schlemilovitch can no longer 
forget that he once forgot. He cannot forget the betrayal. And yet, 
like Bloch, he is French. He remembers both French and Jewish his- 
tory, culture, literature. He drank from the wells of both cultures; he 
too has made France's past his own, but he cannot forget that just 
as France was divided in two zones for four years, her inhabitants 
were divided into two categories-with one rounding up the other. 
Today, he lives in both worlds, he claims both, he loves both: but he 
is torn by their contradictions. 
Upon his arrival in Tel Aviv, Schlemilovitch is greeted by the 
Admiral Levy, who raves, on the one hand, about France's "Liberal 
traditions, the sweetness of the Anjou region, of the Touraine" and 
on the other, about Israel, citing its "prodigious dynamism from Haifa 
to Eilat, from Tel-Aviv to the Dead Sea" (175). Yet, neither Jewish 
"dynamism" nor France's "sweetness" [douceur] figure in 
Schlemilovitch's tortured memory. They simply do not correspond 
to the recent experience of French Jews. When Admiral Levy extols 
the beauty of "La Marseillaise" (a bloody war march), Schlemilovitch 
retorts with a phrase that sums up his quandary: "I am not quite 15
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French, Admiral, I am a French JEW, a French JEW...." He is imme- 
diately sent to jail (189). 
What are the charges against him? Precisely his European Jew- 
ish history, or rather, the way European Jewish history interferes 
with the "Israeli" project of nation-building. When Schlemilovitch 
admits piteously that he has gone to Israel because he "did not 
want to die without having seen the land of [his] ancestors," the 
commissaire Cohen snipes: 
And then, you intended to GO BACK to Europe, didn't you? To 
start your grimaces, your antics [guignol] all over again? Don't 
bother to answer, I know the tune: Jewish distress, Jewish la- 
ment, Jewish anxiety, Jewish despair ... wallowing in their grief, 
asking for more, longing for the sweetness of the ghettos and 
the ecstasy of the pogroms! One of two things Schlemilovitch: 
either you listen to me and you follow my instructions: then, it's 
fine! Or you insist on playing the rebel, the Wandering Jew, the 
persecuted, and in that case, I hand you over to Commandant 
Elias Bloch! (189) 
Why this ultimatum? Skillfully pushing to its farthest limit the 
reductive Manichaean logic that runs through the novel (forgetting 
vs. remembering), Modiano goes "Israel" one better by turning an 
already simplified and distorted representation into its own carica- 
ture. Instead of simply denying the past, his Israel aggressively 
bans it: 
You are now in a country that is young, vigorous, dynamic. 
From Tel Aviv to the Dead Sea, from Haifa to Eilat, no one gives 
a hoot any more about Jewish anxiety, fever, tears, JINX. No 
one! We do not want to hear again about Jewish wit, Jewish 
wisdom, Jewish skepticism, Jewish contortions, Jewish humilia- 
tion and distress. . . . We are energetic guys, pioneers with 
square jaws, and not Yiddish singers, a la Proust, a la Kafka, a la 
Chaplin! (189-90) 
In other words, the only "solution" to the contradictions that 
inhabit the Israeli national project is the radical elimination of any 
person, book, idea, discourse, etc., that risks interfering with the 
representations with which the nation identifies. It is no wonder 
then that Modiano's Tel Aviv looks strangely like Paris. One finds 
there an avenue des Champs-Blysees, an avenue Kleber, a Fifteenth 
Arrondissement, a Place de l'Opera, and, of course, a Place de l'Etoile 16




crowded with G.I.'s flashing their cameras. One moves around town 
in a "panier a salade" (police car), "like those the French police used 
for the big roundup of July 16-17, 1942"(177). One hangs out at the 
Fouquet's, the Hotel Majestic, the Grand-Duc, at 31 bis and 72 av- 
enue Foch, 57 boulevard Lannes, 48 rue de Villejust, 101 avenue 
Henri-Martin, 3 and 5 rue Mallet-Stevens, 21 and 23 square du 
Bois-de-Boulogne, 25 rue d'Astorg, 6 rue Adolphe-Yvon, 64 boule- 
vard Suchet, 49 rue de la Faisanderie, 180 rue de la Pompe. To crown 
this inventory of the buildings requisitioned during the war by the 
French police or the German Gestapo, the main scene of this section 
takes place in the central Gestapo office, at 93 rue Lauriston. On the 
Israeli radio, one listens to Charles Trenet-preferably, to cover the 
cries of tortured prisoners. In Tel Aviv cafés, one dances to the 
voices of Zarah Lelander and Marlena Dietrich, who sing "Li li 
Marlene" and "Der Wind hat mir en Lied erzahlt" (popular hits in 
occupied Paris). At the same time, decadent Jewish books burn in 
giant auto-da-fe and European Jews are led to torture clad in con- 
centration camp garb. On Schlemilovitch's striped pajamas a yellow 
star reads "Franzosich Jude." The weirdoes who hang out in town 
form an abject cosmopolitan group with French, Russian, German, 
and Japanese-sounding names, foreshadowing the one-dimensional 
collaborators who traipse through Modiano's second book, La 
Ronde de Nuit, published one year after La Place de litoile. 
Schlemilovitch has jumped from the frying pan into the fire. His 
flight from one nation that solves the contradictions that haunt it by 
disposing of them has led him to a second nation that does the exact 
same thing, for the very same reasons. Tel Aviv, Paris, Nazi Germany 
are one and the same. Their underlying principle remains the same: 
when collective unity rests on the selective elimination of anything 
and anyone that challenges the story one may wish to believe about 
oneself and one's country, final solutions abound. French Jews 
crossed out their "Jewishness"; France crossed out her collabora- 
tionist past; "Israel" crossed out Jewish martyrdom; Nazi Germany 
crossed out her non-Aryans. The major difference between them 
hinges on the rigor with which this principle was implemented. 
In Conclusion 
I am reminded of the well-known definition of comparison in 
Aristotelian rhetoric in which understanding a figure of speech such 
as "Achilles leaped like a lion" requires that we displace our atten- 17
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tion from the specificity of each object to the qualities they share: 
courage, strength, speed, and generosity. Comparison speaks nei- 
ther of one term nor of the other. Instead, it isolates and brings forth 
the properties that two distinct objects share, abstracts them so to 
speak from the objects themselves and submits them-and them 
alone-to our scrutiny. Achilles is not a lion (it would be absurd to 
discuss the color of his mane). Nor is Tel Aviv Paris. Yet they share 
some essential features brought forth by their juxtaposition. All other 
properties they may have lose any pertinence to the discussion 
(and to the extent that comparison is thus a figure of "exclusion," it 
makes Modiano's rhetorical strategy even more fitting). More than 
it criticizes Frenchmen, Jews, or Israelis, La Place de l'etoile criti- 
cizes a property they have in common: the essentialist assumption 
according to which collective identity is one and indivisible. I do 
not know of a single instance in the modern world where this postu- 
late has worked. And yet it is alive and well, and unfortunately, still 
inspires various forms of extreme intolerance. If La Place de l'itoile 
is not only a masterpiece, but also a courageous book, it is precisely 
because it exposes the limitations and the dangers of this postulate 
wherever it may be at work, even amidst the good intentions that 
pave the road to Hell. 
Notes 
1. A note should be made here of the French Protestants, who suffered 
three centuries of persecution. By the Revolution, however, they were 
largely integrated into the national community. 
2. The Occupation was a time of extreme confusion in France. This essay 
cannot attempt to depict the wealth of nuances that span from one politi- 
cal party or group to another, most of which are still the subject of pas- 
sionate debates. I have chosen to generalize whenever possible, in order to 
avoid cluttering my argument with erudite asides or overly specialized 
references. 
3. Je suis partout was an extreme right newspaper published between 1930 
and 1944. It was pro-Nazi and virulently anti-Semitic. 
4. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are my own. 
5. See Herman Lebovics's discussion of the racist overtones of the nation- 
alist concept of "true France" elaborated by the Right. 18




6. The Franks were German tribes who came to France's territory from the 
north. 
7. "C' est ainsi que to as fait a Soissons avec le vase." Reported by Gregoire 
de Tours in Histoire des Francs. In 1996, France commemorated the 1500th 
anniversary of Clovis's conversion to Catholicism amidst violent conflicts 
over the political future of France. The extreme right, led by Le Pen, seized 
upon the occasion to call for an Aryan state free of immigrants (for the 
most part Muslim); the French church, led by Cardinal Lustiger advocated 
a few steps toward the return of a Catholic state, and the republican Left 
questioned the wisdom of a national commemoration of this particular 
episode. For a discussion of this incident, see Berge. 
8. "Si j' avais des antecedents a un point quelconque de l'histoire de France! 
Mais non, rien" If only I had antecedents at some point in France's his- 
tory! But no, nothing." Modiano uses this quote by Rimbaud as the epi- 
graph of his second novel, La Ronde de nuit (1969). 
9. Bloch had volunteered for service in the French Army. He was fifty-six 
years old and had six children. These lines are taken from the introduction 
to L'etrange defaite, his analysis of France's spectacular military defeat, 
written two months after the fact, and still one of the most lucid accounts 
of that period. 
10. See A. Wieviorka's account of the reactions to Jewish memory right 
after the war (especially 159-328). See also Finkielkraut, as well as my 
own "Beyond Psychoanalysis." 
11. See, for example, Pierre Larousse, who wrote: "The surrounding hatred 
isolated the Israelites and led them to constitute a nation even as they lived 
among other nations. . . . Jews are purebreds [des purs sangs], preserved 
from mongrelization [abatardissement] by the blind hatred of those among 
whom they lived. Indeed, they have kept some of the faults that marked 
them on the shores of the Dead Sea and the Sea of Galilee; indeed, time has 
only exaggerated their greed; but can we blame them for it, after having 
deprived them of any affectionate commerce with us? Have we not ignored 
them until recently, except to hate and pillage them?" (qtd. by Pierre 
Emmanuel in Philippe 6) 
12. As Ferdinand Bruno, the great Republican linguist, confirmed a few 
years later: "in a free nation, language must be one and the same for all" 
(qtd. in Nora VI: 45). 
13. See, for example, Yerushalmi. 
14. This is clearly a simplification-as the Dreyfus Affair, for example, 
shows. It remains, nonetheless, faithful to the general trends within the 
French-Jewish communities (with the notable exception of Alsatian Jews 19
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who, incidentally, were not French between 1871 and 1918, when 
Alsace-Lorraine was annexed by Germany). 
15. Renan also writes: "forgetting and even historical error play a crucial 
role in the formation of a nation; therefore, the progress of historical stud- 
ies often constitutes a danger for nationality. Indeed, historical investiga- 
tion exposes the violent origins of all political formations, even those whose 
effects have proved the most positive. Unity can be achieved by means of 
violence" (7-8). 
16. I have developed this reading of the various theories of suppression in 
my D'un passé l'autre. 
17. Again, I have to simplify. For a more nuanced perspective, see Wieviorka 
and also Rousso (Le Syndrome). 
18. We should note here the logical double bind of the purge, since to 
incriminate a suspect, one must identify a crime-namely, collaboration: 
the very same collective "crime" that Gaullism had set out to efface. See 
Rousso, "Une Justice impossible," and "L'Epuration en France." 
19. In fact, by rejecting any identification with Diaspora Jews targeted by 
these stereotypes, "Israel" played the hand of anti-Semitism and provided 
them much needed excuses. In this perspective, it is interesting to note the 
number of French nationalists who were raging anti-Semites and 
pro-Zionist, from Maurice Barres to Charles Maurras, Georges Montandon, 
Pierre Drieu la Rochelle and Robert Brasillach. In the same vein, on the 
Nazi side, it is worth mentioning Adolph Eichmann, who invoked his 
pro-Zionist record at his postwar trial. 
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